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Teaching With Feminist Judgments 
Kathryn Stanchi,1 Bridget Crawford2 and Linda Berger3 
 
Introduction: The Feminist Judgment Projects 
 
Beginning in Canada, spreading to the United Kingdom, the United States, and around the 
globe, feminist judgments projects emerged from an informal, international collaboration of 
feminist scholars and lawyers who decided to rewrite significant judicial opinions using feminist 
methods and reasoning. One of the primary goals of these projects is to demonstrate that the 
law has a vast, but often unrealized, potential for social justice.  
 
The feminist judgment methodology requires the authors of rewritten opinions to act as judges 
in following the rules of precedent and custom—and to be bound by the same facts and law as 
in the original opinion—while demonstrating that cases can still be decided in ways that 
address social justice concerns. The academics, activists, and lawyers who collaborate on these 
volumes provide rewritten opinions accompanied by commentaries that help law students and 
other readers understand the social and historical context of the original judgment as well as 
the ways in which feminist theories and approaches influenced the feminist judgment’s 
reasoning or outcome or both.  
 
 
1 E.L. Cord Professor of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas, William S. Boyd School of Law. Many thanks to the 
editors of this project for the opportunity to write about this important issue. Also thank you to Sue Liemer, Teri 
McMurtry-Chubb, Melynda Barnhart, Ellie Margolis, Dan Barnett, Laura Graham, George Mader, Charles Calleros 
and Lori Johnson, who generously shared their wisdom and experience with legal writing problems using Title VII.  
2 Professor of Law, Elisabeth Haub School of Law at Pace University. 
3 Professor of Law Emerita, University of Nevada, Las Vegas, William S. Boyd School of Law. 
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While the most obvious use of feminist judgments in the classroom is in feminist or critical 
theory seminars, feminist judgments can also be a rich source of alternative analysis and 
arguments in first year legal writing as well as first year or upper level doctrinal courses. In this 
chapter, we give several examples of how exposing students to the alternative judgments of 
the feminist judgments project in a variety of courses can help students develop a more 
realistic and nuanced view of law that is simultaneously aspirational and based in the real 
world. These alternative judgments are excellent tools to incorporate diverse perspectives in 
the law classroom because they counter the narrative that law is objective while other 
perspectives are political or biased. The first book in the Feminist Judgments series focused on 
the Supreme Court of the United States.4 Other books typically have a specific subject-matter 
focus, including taxation;5 reproductive justice;6 family law;7 trusts and estates;8 employment 
discrimination;9 torts.10 Future volumes are expected in other areas as well.  
 
Using Feminist Judgments in First Year Legal Writing 
Generating creative arguments and problem solutions 
 
Because legal writing is often thought of as a wholly practical “skills” course, it may be difficult 
for some to see how feminist judgments might be useful in teaching it. But the sheer breadth of 
skills taught in legal writing courses provides an array of opportunities to use feminist 
judgments to incorporate diverse viewpoints. Moreover, it is the pigeon-holing of legal writing 
that makes it such an important context for teaching that understanding diversity and different 
perspectives is, in fact, a critical lawyering skill.  
 
 
4 FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: REWRITTEN OPINIONS OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (Kathryn M. Stanchi, Linda L. Berger & 
Bridget J. Crawford eds., 2016) 
5 FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: REWRITTEN TAX OPINIONS (Bridget J. Crawford & Anthony C. Infanti eds., 2017). 
6 FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE REWRITTEN (Kimberly Mutcherson ed., 2020). 
7 FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: FAMILY LAW OPINIONS REWRITTEN (Rachel Rebouché ed., 2020). 
8 FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: REWRITTEN TRUSTS & ESTATES OPINIONS (Deborah S. Gordon, Browne C. Lewis & Carla Spivack eds. 
2020). 
9 FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: REWRITTEN EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION OPINIONS (Ann C. McGinley & Nicole Buonocore Porter 
eds., 2020). 
10 Feminist Judgments: Rewritten Tort Opinions (Martha Chamallas & Lucinda M. Finley eds., 2020). 
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In the first semester, when students learn the basics of legal research and legal analysis, 
including analogical reasoning and problem solving, feminist judgments can give students a 
fresh perspective on the law’s application to a client’s problem and help students think of 
creative ways to further the client’s goals. In the second semester, when students are 
introduced to persuasive writing, feminist judgments can stimulate students to generate 
“outside the box” legal arguments. In both semesters, reading alternative judgments can help 
students think creatively when researching, show students how to do deep factual research, 
and help with cultural competence. 
 
As an example, consider a typical first year legal writing problem involving sex discrimination or 
sexual harassment. This area of law is a fertile source of legal writing assignments, as it teaches 
statutory analysis in a fact sensitive context. A quick survey of the participants on the Legal 
Writing Institute Listserv along with a perusal of the Legal Writing Institute Idea Bank showed 
numerous Title VII based problems used in first year writing. These assignments covered a 
diverse array of topics, from pregnancy discrimination, gender stereotyping (including some 
involving transgender discrimination), hostile work environment sexual harassment, 
discrimination in appearance or dress, and the defense of bona fide occupational qualification. 
These assignments also serve as excellent vehicles to raise diversity issues.  
 
The rewritten judgments can be assigned at varying points in the semester. They could be 
assigned during the research phase, when students are likely to encounter the original opinion. 
They can be assigned for the same class during which the original opinion will be discussed, or 
during a class when the analysis or arguments for the assignment are being discussed. For class 
discussion, the professor can put students in groups and assign them to discover and point out 
the differences in factual context and reasoning in the original and the alternative and 
brainstorm about how the new factual context in the alternative judgments might help them 
see the facts of their own problem, or their client, in a new way. The professor could also 
charge students with creating arguments out of the different reasoning in the alternative 
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judgments. The rewritten judgments have a wide utility in showing students how to shift 
perspective in developing reasoning and arguments in their assignments. 
 
 
Teaching Intersectionality and Cultural Competency 
 
The rewritten judgments can be excellent tools to introduce the concept of intersectionality as 
a source of creative analysis and argumentation. They can also serve as a way of teaching 
students that learning about people with different life experiences is a critical lawyering skill. 
For example, in the sex discrimination assignments reviewed for this chapter, few identified the 
race of the plaintiff, unless the assignment involved a race or ethnicity claim, and almost none 
identified the race of the defendant. This fact alone provides an excellent springboard for class 
discussion, as the absence of any identification raises a number of questions. Are students 
supposed to assume that the parties are white unless otherwise identified? Are the 
assignments subtly teaching students that the law is, or should be, “race neutral” or “color 
blind” in sex discrimination claims? What difference might race make in the analysis of a sex 
discrimination claim? How might race be introduced, in the assignment or in the resulting 
documents, in a way that acknowledges its significance without being discriminatory? All of 
these questions can lead to an important discussion of intersectionality and how cases that 
allege only sex (and not race or ethnicity) discrimination might raise issues of gender-race 
dynamics.  
 
In this situation, a legal writing professor could assign Angela Onwuachi-Willig’s rewritten 
opinion in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, a case involving workplace sexual harassment. 11 
Onwuachi-Willig’s feminist rewrite could be assigned at multiple points in the semester: if the 
assignment will lead students to research and read the original Meritor,12 Onwuachi-Willig’s 
 
11 Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Rewritten Opinion in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, in FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: REWRITTEN 
OPINIONS OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (Kathryn M. Stanchi, Linda L. Berger & Bridget J. Crawford eds., 2016), 
303-321. 
12 477 U.S. 57 (1986). 
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rewrite could be assigned around the time that Meritor is likely to be discussed in class. But 
even if Meritor is not directly applicable to the assignment, Onwuachi-Willig’s rewrite could be 
assigned prior to classes in which the professor expects to challenge students to discuss and 
explore the legal arguments or reasoning related to the assignment. 
 
The rewritten opinion provides a rich education in racial gender politics and shows students 
intersectional analysis articulated in judicial language. If the legal writing assignment did not 
identify the race of the parties, Onwuachi-Willig’s opinion can serve as a tool to push students 
to ask questions related to race and intersectionality and can encourage them to become more 
aware of the different experiences and challenges confronting people of color. If the 
assignment does specify race or ethnicity, the professor can use Onwuachi-Willig’s opinion to 
explore how race or ethnicity might impact the analysis or use it to encourage students to 
broaden their research to include secondary sources that explain intersectional issues in sex 
discrimination or harassment cases. 
 
Teaching Students to Reach Beyond Traditional Reasoning 
 
The rewritten judgments can also help students see deeper issues of diversity and inclusion and 
catch embedded or unconscious bias that they might have missed in the original opinions. In 
one of the assignments I reviewed, for example, a woman employee sues her employer for 
hostile work environment sexual harassment. In one version of the assignment, a male co-
worker shows the employee pornography on his computer and she objects to this, causing her 
other co-workers, including female co-workers, to ostracize her and call her a “prude.” In 
another version of the same assignment, a junior female law firm associate is accosted by her 
supervisor’s husband at a work party, and another lawyer sees what looks like an embrace 
between the two. The female associate is then ostracized by the female supervisor, and both 
male and female coworkers, as a “cheater” and a “homewrecker.” These assignments raise 
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difficult issues of gender stereotyping, particularly because in both cases female employees 
either contribute to the harassment or are not bothered by it.13 
 
In analyzing these assignments, students might research and read, among other cases, Price 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the leading case on sex stereotyping, Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, or 
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, the case holding that same-sex sexual harassment is 
actionable under Title VII.14 These cases contain valuable information the students need to 
conceptualize the legal issues. But the reasoning in the original opinions does not address the 
more complicated gender dynamics raised by the facts and contain reasoning that seems to 
reflect gender or race bias.  
 
Assigning one of the rewritten versions of these cases would allow students to read analysis 
that helps them see a deeper picture of the complicated dynamics of stereotyping. Again, the 
teacher could assign the rewritten case around the time that the students are likely to 
encounter the original case in their research, or may assign the rewritten case to coincide with 
the day the original case would be discussed in class. Because the analysis of the rewritten 
judgments is written in a judicial style, they give the students a model for “translating” critical 
theory into law practice prose.  
 
For example, a professor could assign Martha Chamallas’s rewritten Price Waterhouse v. 
Hopkins, which uses the trial testimony of Dr. Susan Fiske to elaborate on what stereotyping is 
and how it can infect a workplace.15 Seeing a concrete example of how a decision maker might 
use social science in decision-making can help students be more expansive and creative in their 
 
13 The pornography Title VII assignment was originally created by Professor Ellie Margolis at Temple University 
Beasley School of Law. Several assignments (including the ‘homewrecker’ assignment) were created using 
Professor Margolis’s original assignment as a foundation. Both of these assignments are based, in part, on Spain v. 
Gallegos, 26 F.3d 439 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding that female employee ostracized because of rumors of an affair with 
her boss stated prima facie case of hostile work environment). 
14 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989); Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986); Oncale v. 
Sundowner Offshore Services, 523 U.S. 75 (1998). 
15 Martha Chamallas, Rewritten Opinion in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) in FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: 
REWRITTEN OPINIONS OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (Kathryn M. Stanchi, Linda L. Berger & Bridget J. Crawford 
eds., 2016), 345-360. 
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research and argument crafting. In a persuasive writing class, the professor could ask students 
to outline how Chamallas’s rewritten opinion helped them understand more deeply what 
stereotyping and implicit bias are. They can then challenge students to think about how this 
new knowledge might enrich their understanding of their own client’s case. The professor can 
challenge students to come up with ways that social science research might help them better 
understand the issues in their assignment and how social science research might influence or 
enhance their own research or reasoning process. Chamallas’s use of Dr. Fiske’s testimony can 
help students resolve the tougher factual issues, such as the seeming indifference of the other 
female employees to the pornography and the participation of women in the “homewrecker” 
harassment.  
 
Teaching Students to Recognize Hidden Bias in the Law 
 
In addition to helping students understand complex issues of human behavior and how social 
science research can enhance their arguments, the alternative judgments can also help 
students see hidden bias in the law. Because the alternative judgments often confront the 
thornier points of discrimination explicitly, they can often help students manage those issues 
more easily than the originals, which tend to avoid explicit acknowledgement of racism or 
gender bias.  
 
For example, Ann McGinley’s rewritten majority in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., Inc.16 
gives concrete help to students wrestling with how women can sexually harass other women, 
and how to articulate or explain possible underlying motives. Although the original Oncale 
decision clearly stands for the proposition that same sex harassment can create a hostile work 
environment, it misses the opportunity to address why same sex harassment might occur. And, 
the original indicates that Title VII might tolerate “ordinary socializing in the workplace” such as 
“male on male horseplay” and “intersexual flirting.” Students confronting a hostile work 
 
16 Ann McGinley, Rewritten Opinion in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Svcs., in FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: REWRITTEN 
OPINIONS OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (Kathryn M. Stanchi, Linda L. Berger & Bridget J. Crawford eds., 2016), 
414-425. 
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environment problem that involves a complex workplace dynamic may be puzzled by what 
these terms mean – what is the difference between “horseplay” and abuse? What is the 
difference between ordinary social dynamics and ostracizing someone based on sex? Does Title 
VII really force you to socialize with someone you just do not like? 
 
McGinley’s opinion can help with those questions. She gives a number of helpful additional 
examples, exploring the varying and complicated motivations for harassing behavior. For 
example, she notes that “some women engage in discriminatory behavior against other women 
in order to assure their own position among men” and that people may go along with 
discriminatory behavior to enhance their self-worth.17 McGinley’s opinion gives students 
thought-provoking examples that can help them reconcile and articulate why some women 
might participate in the harassment of another woman or tolerate pornography or other 
inappropriate workplace behavior. 
 
 
Teaching First Year Doctrinal Courses with Feminist Judgments 
 
Strengthening doctrinal understanding while studying persuasion and decision making 
 
Large-enrollment courses with heavy doctrinal coverage provide natural—if surprising—
opportunities to work with feminist judgments.  By integrating feminist judgments into 
doctrinal courses, instructors can deepen students’ engagement with doctrinal material while 
also inviting more explicit consideration of how judicial reasoning works and how it may be 
affected by an advocate’s argument choices. For example, when read in comparison with the 
original opinions, the feminist judgments may prompt students to think more carefully about 
how their construction of legal arguments and incorporation of critical perspectives could affect 
the judge’s approach to a problem. Reading the original opinion to compare and contrast it 
with the feminist judgment helps students gain a deeper understanding of not only the 
 
17 Id. at 420. 
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particular substantive law under consideration, but also how an advocate’s choices influences a 
case’s presentation, and how a judge’s world view informs judicial reasoning or outcomes.  
Feminist judgments have the added benefit of revealing the false divides between and among 
skills-oriented courses (including legal writing and reasoning), theory-oriented courses (like 
jurisprudence), and doctrinal classes. 
 
Feminist judgments volumes are being published in a range of doctrinal subject matter areas 
taught in law schools. First year torts is an excellent course for introducing the lessons of 
feminist judgments.  
 
Comparing the original and the feminist judgment in a torts classic  
 
Years after they graduate from law school, lawyers remember Tarasoff v. Regents of University 
of California18 as the case that imposed an affirmative duty to warn on psychotherapists. 
Tarasoff is in the canon: excerpts can be found in every leading torts casebook, and the 
California Supreme Court opinion is said to have helped courts “reconceptualiz[e] the nature 
and source of duty and of tort liability.”19  
 
But the excerpts that made their way into the casebooks—like the majority opinion itself—omit 
facts, context, and theory that support a broader societal duty to protect individuals from the 
violent acts of others. The original opinion recounted the murder of a female college student at 
the University of California at Berkeley by a male student. It mentioned that the male student 
had sought mental health counseling and that his University therapist informed campus police 
about threats made during the counseling. After interviewing him and determining that he was 
“rational,” campus police released the male student. The California Supreme Court held that 
psychotherapists had a duty to warn identifiable third parties of threatened harm from their 
patients, but exempted campus police from the same duty. 
 
 
18 Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of California, 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976).  
19 Peter F. Lake, Revisiting Tarasoff, 58 ALB. L. REV. 97, 98 (1994). 
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When torts professors assign their first-year law students to read the re-envisioned Tarasoff 
opinion from Feminist Judgments: Rewritten Torts Opinions20 alongside the original majority 
California Supreme Court opinion, students encounter a recurring theme against a complex 
cultural backdrop: society’s reluctance to impose responsibility on its members to protect 
individuals from harm caused by third parties. In the feminist judgment, a concurrence and 
partial dissent, Justices Sharmila Lodhia and Stephanie Wildman agree that the therapist had a 
duty to warn, but they would also impose a duty on campus police.21  
 
One way of introducing the legal and policy issues underlying Tarasoff is to have students first 
read the full majority opinion (a necessary first step because the casebook excerpts do not 
address the court’s reasoning on the responsibility of the campus police) and then the feminist 
judgment. The professor could also ask students to draft and bring to class an argument on the 
issue of the duty owed by the campus police—arguing either on behalf of Tatiana Tarasoff’s 
parents or the campus police. The professor could structure the class discussion around the 
arguments the students have drafted, using guided questions such as:  
 
1. The feminist authors believe that their more detailed factual background “provides 
significant insight into the cross-cultural and gender realities that bear on understanding why a 
duty by defendants to warn Tarasoff of her physical peril existed in this case.” Do the additional 
facts provided about Prosenjit Poddar (the male student), Tatiana Tarasoff (the female 
student), and the actions taken by the psychotherapist and the campus police significantly 
change your understanding of the motivations and actions of the parties? How did this affect 
the arguments you made on behalf of one or more of the parties? 
2. For example, the feminist judgment states that “[m]ore careful scrutiny of the 
behavior of individuals involved in this case by the therapist and/or police might have revealed 
the volatility of this particular intimate relationship. . . . Dr. Moore asserted in his letter to the 
 
20 FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: REWRITTEN TORT OPINIONS (Martha Chamallas & Lucinda Finley eds., 2020).  
21 Sharmila Lodhia & Stephanie Wildman, Rewritten Opinion in Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of California, in FEMINIST 
JUDGMENTS: REWRITTEN TORTS OPINIONS,  __. 
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campus police that one of the causes of Poddar’s severe emotional distress was his perception 
that Tarasoff had violated ‘his honor.’” Should this fact (as just one example) have been 
included in the original judgment? How did the absence of such facts affect the reasoning and 
the outcome, if at all? 
3. The feminist judgment points to race- and gender-linked patterns of violence. If you 
included such patterns in your argument, how did you provide evidence of them? How would 
you? Should judges take these patterns into account in determining the question of the duty of 
the University and its agents to warn an individual who has been threatened by a patient of the 
University? How are the patterns relevant? Are they prejudicial?  
4.  The feminist judgment begins by referring to the “Good Samaritan conundrum” in 
tort law and points out that traditionally there has been no duty to rescue except when a 
special relationship exists. But it goes on to find justification for a duty to warn in democratic 
principles and in “the cultural and gender context in which the question of duty to protect 
arises on the basis of these facts.” Are these two new rationales equally persuasive? Did you 
present either or both of them in your argument? Would you present either or both of them to 
a court?   
 5. The California Supreme Court majority held that the campus police owed no duty to 
Tarasoff because unlike the defendant therapists, they had no “special relationship to either 
Tatiana or to Poddar sufficient to impose upon such defendants a duty to warn respecting 
Poddar’s violent intentions.” The feminist judgment’s third rationale for imposing a duty is the 
majority’s failure to delineate any actual distinction between the two sets of university 
employees. Is the feminist judgment more or less persuasive when it relies on this 
disagreement with the majority opinion? 
  6. The feminist judgment explicitly adopts feminist argumentation methods. For 
example, the authors more extensively use (1) narrative facts to illuminate what happened and 
to explain the motivations and actions of the parties; the authors provide more information 
about the (2) broader cultural and social context within which the murder took place; and the 
authors cite (3) a law review article rather than a case or statute for one of their main legal 
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theories. Are any similar argumentation methods used in the majority opinion? Comparing the 
two opinions, which seems the most persuasive? Why? 
 7. If you were writing an alternative judgment rather than an argument on behalf of one 
of the parties, what would be the basis of your reasoning on the issue of the duty of the 
campus police? Your outcome?  
 
This assignment deepens law students understanding of Tarasoff while introducing alternative 
sources and methods of argument that they are unlikely to encounter in their first year torts 
course. As a result, it helps students become more sophisticated readers of judicial opinions 
and more knowledgeable and resourceful authors of legal arguments.  
 
Teaching Upper Level Doctrinal Courses With Feminist Judgments  
 
Uncovering the lack of neutrality in seemingly neutral law  
 
“Money law”22 courses like Federal Income Taxation might at first seem unlikely candidates for 
introducing feminist judgments. But, in fact, these courses are especially hospitable to working 
with feminist judgments because students who are intimidated by the subject are glad to 
encounter more accessible material. Students who think they already know something about 
the subject are challenged in their assumption that the tax law is neutral and unbiased.  
Students who fall somewhere in the middle of that spectrum bring to the material an openness 
to any pedagogical methods that illuminate a complex topic. 
 
Doing a “Blind” Comparison of the Original Opinion and Feminist Rewrite 
A particularly provocative way of integrating feminist judgments into a large Federal Income 
Tax class—or indeed any large doctrinal course—is to ask students to read a feminist judgment 
and a published case without revealing which is which. In the part of the Federal Income Tax 
 
22 The phrase is Alice Abreu’s. See Alice G. Abreu, Tax Counts: Bringing Money-Law to LatCrit, 78 DENV. U.L. REV. 
575, 575 n.1 (2001) (“By ‘money-law,’ I mean the areas traditionally viewed as comprising the business curriculum: 
tax, corporations, securities, commercial law (UCC), securities, banking, antitrust and the like”). 
 13 
course devoted to medical expense deductions, for example, students typically read the 
relevant section of the Internal Revenue Code that permits a deduction for “expenses paid 
during the taxable year, not compensated for by insurance or otherwise, for medical care….”23 
Students also read the related Treasury Regulations, one or more cases that explore the 
meaning of “medical care,” and rulings by the Internal Revenue Service about what can and 
cannot be deducted as medical expenses.24 Cult deprogramming? Not deductible.25 That 
pilgrimage to a religious shrine? Not deductible.26 But clarinet lessons, when recommended by 
an orthodontist as a treatment for crooked teeth? Deductible.27 
 
A professor can integrate into this typical set of reading assignments one of the opinions from 
Feminist Judgments: Rewritten Tax Opinions,28 along with the original case. For this exercise, 
the instructor should take care that the differences in format do not give away, by typeface or 
otherwise, that one is a real court opinion and one is an alternative judgment. As one example, 
when teaching deductions, the instructor could assign the United States Tax Court’s decision in 
O’Donnabhain v. Commissioner,29 which held that many (but not all) of the taxpayer’s expenses 
for what the court called “sex reassignment surgery” did constitute medical care for tax 
purposes along with the feminist judgment in that case, written by Professor David B. Cruz. 
Professor Cruz’s reimagined majority opinion allows a deduction for all of the taxpayer’s 




23 26 U.S.C. § 213(a) (allowing for medical expense deduction). 
24 See, e.g., JOEL E. NEWMAN, DOROTHY A. BROWN & BRIDGET J. CRAWFORD, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: CASES, PROBLEMS & 
MATERIALS (7th ed. 2019). 
25 I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 80-21-004 (Feb. 26, 1980). 
26 Ring v. Commissioner, 23 T.C. 950 (1955) (denying deduction for taxpayer’s pilgrimage to Our Lady of Lourdes 
Shrine in France). 
27 Rev. Rul. 62-210, 1962-2 C.B. 89. 
28 FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: REWRITTEN TAX OPINIONS (Bridget J. Crawford & Anthony C. Infanti eds., 2017). 
29 O’Donnabhain v. Commissioner, 134 T.C. 34, action on dec., 2011-47 (Nov. 21, 2011). 
30 David B. Cruz, Rewritten Opinion in O’Donnabhain v. Commissioner, in FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: REWRITTEN TAX OPINIONS  
(Bridget J. Crawford & Anthony C. Infanti eds., 2017) 274-96.  
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Without any introductory framing, the professor can guide students through a series of 
questions. The initial focus should be on how the two opinions vary in terms of the language 
the judges use to describe the taxpayer and what facts the judges highlight in their opinion. 
Students quickly identify that one opinion (which later is revealed as the actual, original 
opinion) focuses on the fact that the taxpayer was born as a male, served in the military as a 
man, married a woman, was the biological father of three children, and received extensive 
psychological counseling and a medical diagnosis of “severe” gender identity disorder.31 The 
other opinion (which is later revealed as the feminist judgment) begins with the simple 
sentence, “Rhiannan O’Donnabhain is a taxpayer,” and then takes brief note of her life 
experience as a man and her medical diagnosis before turning to the core of the opinion: a 
discussion of the taxpayer’s medical expenditures.32 
 
Students then explore whether the facts and contextual background that come to the forefront 
in one opinion but not the other, and how that emphasis (or deemphasis) impacts their views 
of the taxpayer.  The instructor might ask whether the students sensed any shift in their own 
personal view of the taxpayer—as sympathetic or unsympathetic, for example—after reading 
one opinion versus both opinions. Depending which opinion the student reads first, the 
subjective impression of the taxpayer might vary considerably. 
  
Students easily identify the differences in the holding of each opinion. One (later revealed as 
the original opinion) disallows a deduction for the taxpayer’s breast augmentation surgery 
“because the petitioner already had normal breasts before surgery.”33 The other (later revealed 
as the feminist judgment) permits a deduction for all of the taxpayer’s transition care, including 
the breast augmentation, reasoning that “[d]ue regard for the well-being of transgender 
persons counsels more tolerance for conclusions regarding the necessity of their attempts to 
bring their bodies into alignment with the gender identity disorder….”34 Although both the 
 
31 134 T.C. at 35, 39. 
32 Cruz, supra note 30, at 274-75. 
33 134 T.C. at 72. 
34 Cruz, supra note 30, at 296. 
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original opinion and the feminist judgment are “pro taxpayer” in that they allow deductions, 
what is the significance of permitting a deduction for breast augmentation of “normal breasts”? 
Who decides what breasts are “normal”?  Some instructors might be understandably reluctant 
to discuss such a seemingly non-tax subject as human anatomy (and corresponding socially 
constructed views of the “normal” woman or man), but it serves the larger pedagogical point 
that taxation is, indeed, implicated in all aspects of life, and that lawyers must be able to talk 
about difficult, uncomfortable, or “private” topics with professionalism and in a manner that 
recognizes humanity and dignity of all people. 
 
Students then can turn to the language of the Internal Revenue Code and Treasury Regulations 
to ground their views of which of the opinions is correct as a matter of law. To do so, they must 
grapple with the meaning of “medical care,” and how the tax law result in this case (i.e., 
deductibility) depends on the labeling of the trans taxpayer as having a “disease.” That is 
because medical care, for purposes of Internal Revenue Code § 213, is defined as amounts paid 
“for the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment or prevention of disease, or for the purpose of 
affecting any structure of function of the body.”35 In one of the opinions (later revealed as the 
feminist judgment) the judge (Professor David B. Cruz writing as Judge Cruz) embraces the 
disease model “advisedly and not without hesitation, not wanting to reinforce a notion that the 
taxpayer was defective in any way or that she needed to be ‘cured.’ ” 36  At the same time, the 
feminist judgment recognizes that the taxpayer’s “disease” diagnosis is crucial to the finding 
that her expenditures are deductible. This is an opportunity in the classroom discussion to talk 
about judicial decision making and tone—the two opinions have radically different ways of 
talking about the taxpayer and her medical treatment. If the class discussion appears to be 
replicating some of the biases embedded in the original opinion, the instructor can ask students 
to take a short one-minute writing break, to take quick notes for themselves about the words 
they find themselves using when talking about or reflecting on the taxpayer, and comparing—
as a matter of self-reflection only—how their vocabulary and tone is closer to one opinion or 
 
35 26 U.S.C. § 213(d)(a) (defining “medical care”) 
36 Cruz, supra note 30, at 282. 
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the other. The instructor might choose at that point to move the discussion in another 
direction. 
 
At any point during the discussion, or at the end, the professor can reveal which opinion is the 
original and which is the shadow judgment.  Students generally understand the larger feminist 
judgments project once they learn of its goals to show by doing that the law could be different 
if a feminist perspective applies. In a course in federal income taxation, students typically are 
not expecting to hear the word “feminist.” Therefore, in describing the larger feminist 
judgments project, the instructor has an opportunity to explain how feminist legal theory, just 
like other critical perspectives, can serve as a lens for evaluating both substantive law and its 
interpretation. For students who resist the term “feminist” as applied to the rewritten opinion 
in O’Donnabhain (or any opinion), they might be asked to identify a term that seems more 
accurate to them.  Students might suggest “humanist,” or “rights-based,” among other labels.  
The “feminist” identifier may not sit easily for some students; others will be open to it. For 
those of us for whom feminism and justice are synonymous, securing student acceptance of the 
label is not an especially important pedagogical goal. If the students recognize the differences 
in the opinion, the goal has been met: they can see in the side-by-side opinions what a 
difference perspective makes. 
 
If students can conclude their reflections with consideration of what impact the feminist 
judgments might have had on the subsequent development of the law, they are themselves 
doing the same work that the contributors to the feminist judgments projects are doing. By 
asking how the feminist judgment squares with or challenges traditional measurements of tax 
law--efficiency, neutrality and horizontal equity—students acquire a new perspective on a 
subject they either thought they knew, or did not, but now appreciate more deeply. This ability 
to reflect critically is a skill that transports across the curriculum and throughout a lawyer’s 
career. Honing that skill through “money law” courses is an unexpected but memorable 




These are just a few of the possible ways that feminist judgments can be incorporated into law 
teaching. Because the rewritten opinions use the same law and precedent in effect at the time 
of the original decision, any differences in reasoning or result invite consideration. The fact that 
the opinion rewriter reached a different (or the same) holding with language that departs from 
(or comports with) the original opinion forces students to confront the malleability of law. How 
one interprets and applies the law is the product of historical context, (typically unmentioned) 
intellectual commitments, and what the judge determines “counts” as important in decision 
making—which might relate to how much of the parties’ individual stories factor into the 
judicial opinion and what sources are treated as the basis for that opinion. By heightening 
students’ awareness of the importance of perspective, feminist judgments are invaluable and 
flexible teaching tools.  
